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Tangredi: Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, byGeorge Friedman

to Ruth Benedict’s much-maligned
yet still-influential 1946 work The
Chrysanthemum and the Sword, a
general primer on the seemingly
contradictory forces driving this global
power. For those with a professional
interest in the country and its region,
this book is a must-read, an enlightening
facilitator in the current debate over
Japan’s place in Asia and the world.
J. OVERTON

Flash Points: The Emerging Crisis in Europe, by
George Friedman. New York: Doubleday, 2015.
288 pages. $28.95.

Flash Points is both an elegant and a
disturbing book. Not simply elegant
in its writing style, which is direct and
clear, but also in its initial discussion of
the age of discovery and enlightenment
that propelled the European nations
into becoming world powers—you
rarely find a more cogent and concise
explanation of the roots of European
social, cultural, political, and economic
development. Yet the book is also very
disturbing because it details how the
factors that allowed Europe to transform
the world—faith, individualism, scientific inquiry, ideas of self-determination
and legal rights, and nationalism—also
contributed to the almost unfathomable
destruction of the two world wars that
tore it apart. George Friedman details
the region’s history, current events, and
potential future in a way that makes
an admonishment from his father, a
Hungarian Jewish survivor of both the
Nazis and the Soviets, seem very true:
“Europe will never change. It will just
act as if nothing happened” (p. 23).
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Freidman, the well-known founder of
Stratfor.com, one of the first private
intelligence firms to be a major presence on the web, and an author of
prescient books on the future security
environment, begins with the personal
history of how and why his family escaped Hungary in 1949. Having
survived the horrors of World War
II and the Communist takeover in a
weak, dependent, and occupied nation,
Friedman’s father wanted his family
to go to America and “live in a strong
country with weak neighbors and, if
possible, no Nazis, communists, or
anyone else who believed in anything
deeply enough to want to kill him
and his family over it” (p. 17). His
view—that a humane peace in Europe
always would be a mere interlude—sets
the scenario for the rest of the book.
This fear is, of course, what spurred the
creation of the European Union (EU).
Friedman analyzes the weaknesses
of the EU and the sources of conflict
throughout Europe, particularly in a
situation in which NATO’s perceived
importance has diminished, and
concludes that the centripetal forces of
geopolitics are just too strong. It is not
just the potential collapse of the euro; it
is the fact that national identities cannot
be supplanted by a European identity
without destroying a cultural diversity
established over millennia. The fact that
the EU appeared to achieve some small
success in cultivating a cosmopolitan
Europeanness is, in Friedman’s view,
merely a veneer that a U.S. commitment
to defending a cold peace under unique
historical circumstances made possible.
Those circumstances have devolved.
With the controlling pressures
removed, Yugoslavia—perhaps the
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greatest attempt at fusing otherwise
hostile nationalities—exploded into
violence until all sides were exhausted
by fighting or concluded that opposing
NATO’s wishes was too costly. But that
was before a resurgent Russia could
intervene on behalf of the Serbs. Friedman’s book tours the other potential
flash points of Europe within a background where Russia is back, and the
geopolitical question of who will be the
hegemonic leader of Europe—France,
Germany, or Russia—has returned. It
is not ambition that drives; it is fear of
the power of the others (as Thucydides
described so many centuries ago). By
all measures, Germany would remain
the dominant power in economics, as
it is the economic engine of the EU
today. But it also is the power most
easily invaded from both east and west.
And it is growing impatient with the
seeming impossibility of creating an EU
that conforms to its view of necessary
order. The Germans, according to
Friedman, view themselves as the
victims of the EU/euro economic
crisis. What would it mean to the EU,
NATO, and specifically eastern Europe
if Germany were to cut a deal with
Russia to secure its own “permanent”
peace—secure to be the export
power it already is beyond Europe?
In Friedman’s view, the question of
Germany, Russia, and European peace
is one of national culture as well as
geopolitics: “For the Germans, success
and disaster are intimately linked, so
they are simultaneously afraid of what
they have achieved and tremendously
proud of it. . . . They do not aspire
to lead a new Europe. They fear that
they cannot escape the role. The rest
of Europe harbors suspicions that
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Germany’s public fears and modesty are
feigned, that in the end the old Germany
has never died but has merely been
asleep” (p. 153). Add in Russian pressure
and the fact that post–Cold War
Germany is united, and the European
foundation seems a lot less stable.
Even if the European powers never
are moved to conflict with each other,
Friedman’s conclusion is that the situation can make the continent safe for
ethnic breakups, with all the resulting
potential for wars—or perhaps hybrid
wars and gray-zone conflicts—to
occur. Russia will be the first to take
advantage of that, prompting others to
do the same. He predicts that “Europe’s
history of conflict is far from over. . . .
[I]n many places Europe’s anger against
other Europeans is still there” (p. 251).
Ultimately, Friedman sees the future still
controlled by Europe’s “Faustian spirit”
that “haunted its greatest moment, the
Enlightenment,” defined as “the desire
to possess everything even at the cost of
their souls,” and today “everything at no
cost” (p. 257). By “everything,” he means
national sovereignty without the exercise
of national sovereignty; wealth distribution without work distribution; a world
in which they can feel like the hegemon
but not have to be it; a world in which
wars would stop without intervention; and, perhaps worst of all, ethnic
nationalism without its implications.
What can be done to prevent growing
conflicts? Friedman flirts with the fact
that America today is still as powerful
as it was when it put out “the European
fire in 1918 and 1945” and contained
it during the Cold War. But can it do
so in the future? Should it do so in the
future, or do the fires need to burn
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themselves out? Friedman is not sure,
but he does give us a disturbing prospect
about which we need to think deeply.
SAM J. TANGREDI

The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation,
and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region,
by Michael R. Auslin. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ.
Press, 2017. 304 pages. $30.

The signature foreign policy move,
and greatest strategic insight, of Barack
Obama’s presidency was “the pivot”—
later renamed “the rebalance”—to the
Asia-Pacific region. President Obama’s
initiative grew out of his conviction that
Asia had become the most important
region in terms of economic dynamism,
explosive demographic growth, and
growing military tensions. And if one
broadens the geography and semantics
to include India—yielding the “IndoPacific”—this makes utter sense, since
the region claims 60 percent of the
world’s population, nearly 40 percent of
total global economic output, some of
the fastest-growing and most capable
militaries, and three nuclear states. No
surprise, then, that the Obama White
House argued in a November 2015 fact
sheet that this region “is increasingly the
world’s political and economic center of
gravity.” Or, as top Asia expert and diplomat Kurt M. Campbell astutely wrote
in The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft in Asia, “[T]he lion’s share of
the history of the twenty-first century
will be written in Asia” (pp. 1, 344).
While the Obama administration
made a compelling case for the logic
of pivoting to Asia—that is, elevating
the time, attention, and resources
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given to the region relative to other
parts of the world—the results were
uneven. Washington reinvigorated its
diplomacy in the region, strengthened
commitments with U.S. treaty allies,
forged relationships with new partners
such as Burma, began shifting military
assets to the region, and negotiated
a far-reaching trade deal intended to
deepen economic integration. But it also
failed to ratify that trade deal, suffered
significant political setbacks with treaty
allies Thailand and the Philippines,
was unable to counter Pyongyang’s
rush toward acquiring nuclear weapons
capable of reaching the United States,
and did little to restrain Chinese
maritime assertiveness and economic
and political coercion in the region.
How then should one understand and
evaluate the myriad factors contributing
to Asia’s future? And are the risks to
the continued growth and stability of
the region now eclipsing the region’s
promise? These are the questions that
Michael Auslin, scholar in residence
at the American Enterprise Institute,
asks in his judicious, sobering, and
compelling new book The End of the
Asian Century. Auslin argues that Asia’s
future is significantly less assured than
is commonly held. As a longtime scholar
of, frequent traveler to, and trenchant
observer on the geopolitics of Asia, he
is positioned well to make such a case.
This book is far from a polemic; in
fact, Auslin approaches these questions
as a skeptic, describing how he in fact
originally held the opposite belief—that
the twenty-first century inevitably
looked to be an Asian century. Yet
through repeated trips to the region and
multiple meetings with senior policy
makers, businessmen, and military
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